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Abstract
As venture capital expands in relevance and influence, investors will begin to face
inevitable challenges when deciding where and how to allocate VC funding. Though substantial
research has been done to evaluate the myriad financial structures of venture capital, the
literature on cross-border VC and its applications are quite limited. This paper will assess the
barriers to cross-border VC investments into conflict zones, aiming to understand the feasibility
of such investments under the modern VC paradigm. Common barriers will be tested against
interviews with a range of venture capital investors to understand the relative importance of these
barriers and the extent to which venture capitalists aim to mitigate them. Further, the paper will
develop concrete insights into the relevant opportunities and risks present in conflict zone VC
investments, along with proposed adjustments to the VC investment model that aim to ameliorate
the risks. Ultimately, we aim to understand the calculus of venture capitalists and the ways in
which conflict zone opportunities are commonly evaluated, allowing future investors to better
examine these opportunities under the framework of a dynamic investment model.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Introduction / Definitions
The growing prevalence of technology in modern society has promulgated the surge of a
niche alternative asset class – venture capital. A subset of private equity, venture capital (VC)
denotes investments directed towards the early-stage growth or development of companies. 1 VC
funding is a valuable process in the expansion of technology enterprises, as VCs tend to target
young companies operating with negative cash flows in uncertain industries and volatile
markets2. In doing so, they often take an active monitoring role in the time they hold the
investment, aiming to sell their stake for significant gains five to seven years after the initial
investment.3 Thus, the purchase of minority equity stakes in these companies represents a high
tolerance of risk on behalf of the VCs relative to most traditional late-stage private equity
investments. This yields further questions regarding the ways in which VCs evaluate this risk,
namely as it applies to companies with which they lack familiarity.
Before the dot-com boom, VC was almost entirely a locally-focused industry4, meaning that
investors rarely sought opportunities outside of their own geographies. Recently, the industry has
witnessed a surge in cross-border investments. Aizenman and Kendall document a rise in crossborder participation in VC deals from 15 percent in the early 1990s to 40 percent in 20075, with
this figure having grown further since the report. Driving this trend are various factors including
heightened globalization, diminishing information asymmetries, and economic changes in

Drover, W., Busenitz, L., Matusik, S., Townsend, D., Anglin, A. and Dushnitsky, G. (2017) A review and road
map of entrepreneurial equity financing research: venture capital, corporate venture capital, angel investment,
crowdfunding, and accelerators. Journal of Management 43( 6): 1820– 1853.
2 Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (2001) The venture capital revolution. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 15:2.
3 Ibid.
4 Cumming, D. and Dai, N. (2010) Local bias in venture capital investments. Journal of Empirical Finance. 17:3.
5 J. Aizenman, J. Kendal. The internationalization of venture capital Journal of Economic Studies, 39 (2012),
pp. 488-511
1

developed economies. Namely, the credit meltdown in the US and the Eurozone is often seen as
the primary force that directed VC funds internationally, towards countries like India and China
that showed greater stability as the west was reeling from a recession. 6 For the purposes of this
paper, a cross-border VC investment describes any early-stage investment made from a for-profit
VC based out of a Western polity into another polity. Now, as VC continue to expand their
geographic scope, potential opportunities may arise in areas previously overlooked entirely by
international investors – conflict zones.
Defined as “regions of war, insurgency, or severe lawlessness,” conflict zones represent
regions facing political and economic stability that disrupts essential services and domestic
business activity. Common characteristics of conflict zones include but are not limited to the
imposition of economic sanctions, collapse of aspects of civil infrastructure, and an unstable
system of governance and legal procedures.
Despite the high unpredictability associated with conflict zones, these regions continue to
house growing enterprises that seek funding at all stages. As a consequence of limited domestic
investment infrastructure, these companies are often only able to find meaningful foreign
investment from international investors, which the UN describes are being instrumental in
stimulating development and post-conflict economic recovery. 7 That being said, myriad barriers
exist deterring western investors from deploying funds into conflict zones, ranging from
institutional access barriers to more the evaluation of political and corruption risks.
This paper will assess these barriers to understand the potential for cross-border VC
investments into conflict zones. Common barriers will be tested against interviews with a range

Bain and Company (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) “India Private Equity Report”
United Nations (2009). Report of the secretary-general on the work of the organization. General Assembly Official
Records. Fifty-fourth Session. Supplement, No. 1 (A/54/1).
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of venture capital investors to understand the relative importance of these barriers and the extent
to which venture capitalists aim to mitigate them.

1.2. Normative Disclaimer
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is essential to note that this paper focuses only on a
single side of the VC deal process. Though the paper examines deals purely from the perspective
of investors, it is important to recognize that there is an entirely distinct side of the investment
process relating to the entrepreneurs and companies receiving investments. This side of the
investment process should not be ignored, and investments should not be conducted purely
because of the value they provide to investors. This paper focuses the thought processes of VC
investors from a financial perspective, though the externalities of these investments on
entrepreneurs, emerging economies, and the general population must play a vital role in these
investments processes as well.

1.3. Literature Review & Contribution statement
The contribution of this paper can be expressed by examining two gaps in existing literature:
1) Research on cross-border VC activity that does not examine conflict zones specifically
2) Research on conflict zone investments that does not examine VC specifically
In the first category, the bulk of existing research on cross-border VC activity is valuable in
elucidating empirical evidence to infer a VC firm’s decision-making process in cross-border
investments. Namely, the predominantly quantitative research works to reinforce an
understanding of general barriers and mitigation techniques for international VC firms, though
various factors inherent to conflict zones tend to be ignored in these analyses. These include

differentiators like unavoidable political turbulence and economic turmoil that is not necessarily
present in other international investments. That being said, the literature helps understand the
impact of target and home country development on the quantity of investments made. These
analyses have found that VC firms tend to avoid investing abroad when presented with more
promising investment opportunities in their home country.8 Further, research shows that target
countries housing active capital markets and stock markets tend to witness greater VC capital
inflow due to the facilitation of exit opportunities. 9 Quantitative research has also shown that
factors like political instability and cross-border differences often deter investors from pursuing
foreign opportunities due to subsequent limited returns. Research examining specific conflict
zones in detail has yielded the same general takeaway, with papers by Vijaykumar and
Chowdhury10 finding that local conflict had a negative impact on foreign investment quantities in
Sri Lanka and Uganda respectively. 11 12 Further research on VC investment trends has indicated
a trend between exchange rate volatility and foreign direct investment in emerging markets.
These findings indicate that certain firms are more likely than others to invest internationally,
and that these investments are empirically more likely to occur in certain regions. That being
said, the application of these findings to conflict zones requires a thorough understanding of the
unique political and economic climate in conflict zones and the ways in which they exhibit
similarities to other, commonly studied emerging markets. This paper will expand on the existing

Schertler, A. and Tykvová, T. (2011) Venture capital and internationalization. International Business
Review 20( 4): 423– 439.
9 Groh, A.P., von Liechtenstein, H. and Lieser, K. (2010) The European venture capital and private equity country
attractiveness indices. Journal of Corporate Finance 16( 2), 205– 224.
10 Chowdhury, M. (2011). The Determinants of Entrepreneurship in a Conflict Region: evidence from the
Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship, 265-181
11 Vijayakumar, S. (2012). Growth and issues of small and medium enterprises in post-conflict Jaffna Sri Lanka.
International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 3 (3)
12 Tsounis, N. and Vlahvei, A. 2012. The Impact of Exchange Rate Volatility on Foreign Direct Investment in Iran.
Procedia Economics and Finance.
8

work by pairing it with interview insights to ground this empirical research in concrete
expressions of VC decision-making processes.
In the second category, the literature on conflict zone investment often ignores VC as a
specific asset class, instead focusing more broadly on FDI. This is primarily driven by the recent
prevalence of VC as a newer investment model, along with the general scarcity of VC
investments in these regions. That being said, substantial literature has focused on the impact of
subsidiary and joint venture formation in conflict zones, often noting that locating in a conflict
zone is a highly risk endeavor likely to cause substantial disruptions.13
The aforementioned gaps in existing literature are both primarily driven by the lack of
existing VC investments in conflict zones. It is precisely for this reason that this paper aims to
shed light on these potential investments, using a combination of interview insights with existing
empirical literature to understand how these opportunities ought to be evaluated.

1.4. Presentation of Research Question
This paper ultimately aims to demonstrate:
i)

Whether value can be extracted by venture capitalists through investments in
conflict zones

ii)

The barriers that hinder the extraction of this aforementioned value, and

iii)

How these barriers can be overcome through adjustments of the traditional VC
due diligence framework

Henisz, W. J. (2000). The institutional environment for multinational investment. Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 16(2): 334–364.
13

2. Insights from Venture Capitalists

2.1. Interview Design
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format to allow for free-flowing conversation
and to adjust based on a respondent’s specific background. The questions were generally guided
by a questionnaire consisting of both open-ended and specific questions. Some of these questions
involved, but were not limited to:
1. When evaluating investment opportunities in conflict zones, what barriers are most
prevalent from a VC’s perspective?
2. How does the composition of your LP base impact the types of investments that you can
make and your firm’s level of risk tolerance? Does your fundraising team keep this in
mind when raising institutional funds?
3. How have you found the competition / bidding wars to be in conflict zones? Do you
generally face less competition from outside investors than you would in other regions?
4. Post-investment, how have you found working with management teams in conflict zones?
5. Given the barriers discussed, what measures does your firm tend to take to overcome
these barriers and successfully execute an investment?

It is important to note that interview respondents would often discuss other matters not
directly prompted by the questions, yielding interviews with varied topics of focus. Often,
this occurred as respondents focused more on matters they found to be particularly salient
and relevant to their respective work. Nonetheless, these interview insights remain
tremendously valuable through both the individual responses provided by the respondents,

along with a comparative analysis of responses between respondents driven by their variation
in backgrounds and investment strategies.

2.2. Respondent Profiles
A total of 12 respondents were interviewed in this study. Respondents consisted of:
•

The founder of an American venture capital firm with over 2,500 previous investments
across 75 countries,

•

A partner at a fund specializing in small-to-medium sized enterprises in Eastern Europe,
with a specialized focus on post-conflict regions,

•

The Chief Investment Officer of an impact investment fund focusing on venture capital
investments in Latin America,

•

A partner at a venture capital firm specializing in emerging markets,

•

The founder of a British venture capital f,irm with over 50 previous investments focused
on the Middle East and North Africa

•

Four lower-level investment analysts / associates at US-based impact-focused venture
capital firms, each firm having invested into multiple emerging markets,

•

Three investors at varying venture capital firms (not impact investors), all focusing
predominantly on Western markets and having made a small number of investments in
conflict zones and post-conflict zones.

All respondents had some level of experience executing and overseeing investments in conflict
zones and/or post-conflict zones. Further, all respondents held this experience at for-profit
venture capital firms consisting of a diversified LP base. In sum, the interview respondents held
experiences evaluating investment opportunities across conflict zones in Africa, South America,

Eastern Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East, covering over 100 countries. Examples of
these conflict zone regions include Kenya, Egypt, Venezuela, Georgia, Palestine, and Ukraine.
Most respondents also had experience in a broad set of cross-border investments beyond conflict
zones, and were also able to use these insights to drive their responses to more general questions.

2.3. Overview of interview responses
The interview responses provided a highly varied overview of myriad venture capitalists’
perspectives on conflict zone investments. Respondent’s analyses of conflict zone investments
often varied based on the aspects of their specific fund (namely, the number of investments they
complete, whether it is an impact-focused fund, the fund’s home country, and the experience of
founders in conflict zones.) Responses and claims made in the interviews were analyzed in
conjunction with existing literature on cross-border venture capital and conflict zone investing to
ground the respondents’ assertions and evaluate them in the context of the respondent’s specific
background. From here, insights were ultimately derived to address the paper’s research
questions.

2.4. Discussion of notable themes arising from interviews

2.4.1. High-volume venture capitalists tend to have a higher risk tolerance than other
investors, resulting in a greater willingness to pursue conflict zones investments.
A common issue discussed in interviews was that of the venture capitalists’ risk
tolerance, as this often served as the basis for their investment decisions. Of the 12 respondents,
four of their firms can be classified as being “high-volume” VC firms, denoting the fact that they

aim to make over 50 investments per year. Four of the five respondents classified under this
category noted that their firms do not view conflict zone opportunities substantially differently
from other investments, and that they will not exclude an opportunity immediately because it is
located in a conflict zone. One such respondent noted that “most of our investments are going to
zero anyways,” and given the high-volume investment model of the firm, one investment has a
negligible impact in the broader context of a large fund. The one high-volume VC respondent
who noted that their firm tended to avoid conflict zones cited the firm’s LP base as the primary
reason. This respondent suggested that the LPs of the fund – consisting primarily of pensions and
institutional investors who seek strong, consistent returns – would not tolerate the high inherent
risk associated with conflict zones and would instead pull their money out of the fund. When
questioned about their LP base, the pro-conflict zone high-volume venture capitalists explained
that their LPs primarily consist of high-net-worth individuals and personal investors as opposed
to large institutions.
In contrast, five of the seven venture capitalists working at low-volume firms noted that
they view all conflict zone opportunities negatively, purely due to the regions in which they are
based. These investors provided various diverse explanations for their hesitance, as opposed to
the single explanation regarding LPs that was presented by the high-volume investor whose firm
opposed conflict zone investments. For impact investors, these reasons revolved around the fact
that the institutional barriers in conflict zones often prevented their target firms from achieving
their desired impact. For non-impact investors, these hesitations were rooted in myriad pragmatic
barriers like political risk and corruption, further explored in Section 4 of this paper. One
investor noted the reputation of their firm as motivation for this hesitance, noting that they “don’t
want to be seen as the super risky investors who only invest in the craziest companies”.

2.4.2.

It is generally difficult to earn a commercial rate of return in a conflict

zone, though the few profitable investments tend to generate a significant positive
return.
All interview respondents noted the limited financial upside associated with conflict zone
investment opportunities. This includes both respondents whose firms focus on emerging
markets, along with firms who are agnostic to geography. Reasons cited for seeking this
commercial rate of return include the inherently competitive nature of VC funds and the desire to
secure future funding. One respondent noted, “we can’t invest in politically unstable regions and
then expect to go raise our next fund with that investment on our track record.”
Despite the lower probability of earning a commercial rate of return in conflict zones,
most respondents noted that attractive opportunities in conflict zones can be found at a lower
valuation than in other regions. Of the eight respondents who made this point, seven of them
cited “limited access to capital” as a driver of these compressed valuations, noting that these
entrepreneurs often have fewer opportunities to raise capital and therefore seek valuations below
their intrinsic. Five of these investors also cited a “lack of bidding wars” as a driver. In most
North American VC deals, a number of firms will send bids to the company, after which the
company will choose the best bid (often the one presenting the highest valuation). In conflict
zones, however, the limited number of both domestic and foreign investors makes bidding wars
quite rare, allowing VCs to provide lower valuations. One respondent with experience across
emerging markets noted, “we’re never competing in these regions, so we can get in at really
attractive valuations without needing to invest resources into marketing ourselves and doing
complex deal structures.” The impacts of these low valuations on the VCs’ ultimate decision on

whether or not to invest ultimately came down to the firm’s frequency of investment and focus.
All five high-frequency VC investors noted that these low valuations incited them to pursue past
investments in conflict zones. On the other hand, when asked about these valuations and bidding
wars, only one of the seven low-frequency investors suggested that this factor could singlehandedly encourage an investment, with the rest presenting the barriers to investment as
outweighing this valuation advantage.

2.4.3.

Investors with specialized experience in conflict zones are better-

equipped to address the barriers presented in these regions.
The respondents’ wide array of experience across conflict zones and emerging markets
generally allowed for a comprehensive overview of the previous experiences required to incite
comfortability with conflict zone opportunities. Of the eight investors whose firms focus on
emerging markets, six noted that their firms have comprehensive measures in place to mitigate
risk in these regions that they apply to their conflict zone investments. These included the use of
a specialized in-house legal team, business connections across various regions, and relationships
with political entities in these regions. One investor whose firm focuses on impact investments in
Latin America noted, “our legal team knows these markets inside and out, so nothing takes us by
surprise. We know how to structure complex deals that you couldn’t even find in the US.” This
specialized experience helps to address the institutional barriers in these regions, aiding in the
VCs’ diligence process and allowing them to pursue investments more comfortably.
Of the four investors whose firms focus on a diversity of regions (i.e. no specific market
or set of markets), three noted that their lack of familiarity with a conflict zone region often
elongated diligence processes and caused the termination of potential deals. Regarding a highly-

diligenced opportunity in Syria, one such investor explained, “we really wanted to invest in
them, but every day we would learn something new about the market that just made investing
impossible. It seemed like we had to deal with a different state agency every day, and after a
certain point we just decided it wasn’t worth the hassle.” A lack of familiarity with conflict zone
markets can be especially challenging, given the instability of political and legal structures and
the inherent difficulty of predicting changes in foreign investment policies. The one geographyagonistic firm who described limited hesitations in these regions noted that their firm has
“multiple local branches and investors across four continents,” meaning that they could still
familiarize themselves with numerous international geographies despite being headquartered in
the United States.

2.4.4.

Entrepreneurs in conflict zones tend to be easier to work with, driven by

the scarcity of capital and their desire to maintain strong relationships with
investors.
All respondents had previous experience with entrepreneurs in conflict zones, and each
investor noted that they were able to maintain strong working relationships with these
entrepreneurs throughout the duration of these investors. Common characteristics of these
entrepreneurs included high levels of motivation and ambition, along with a desire to partner
with the VCs as opposed to merely receiving a monetary investment without harnessing
investors’ value-add potential. One investor with experience in both conflict zones and
traditional western markets noted that “these entrepreneurs usually want the opportunity to scale
and expand beyond their conflict zone, and the best way to accomplish this is by getting the
support of an international investor.” Given the scarcity of capital in conflict zones and the

limited number of international investors, companies who have relationships with foreign VCs
are generally inclined to work harder to preserve these ties.

2.4.5.

Post-conflict zones are much more promising areas for investment than

conflict zones, as they have comparable entrepreneurial ecosystems with
substantially less risk.
Three of the interviewees had previous experience in both post-conflict zones and conflict
zones, all noting that they would much rather pursue an opportunity in a post-conflict zone to
mitigate risks. Namely, they noted that the advantages provided in conflict zones (highlymotivate entrepreneurs, low valuations, limited bidding wars) can be found in nearly equal
amounts in both conflict zones and post-conflict zones. The crucial distinction, however, as one
investor noted is that “there is some semblance of stability that we can rely on. Countries that
have just been through heavy conflict want more than anything to maintain order instead of
going back to conflict.” These insights suggest that post-conflict regions provide an insurance of
stability that is rare in conflict zones.
Furthermore, all five respondents from impact-focused investment firms supported
opportunities in post-conflict regions due to the positive social impacts that domestic
entrepreneurship can have on a region’s recovery and growth prospects. Impact investors’
mandate combines both social impact and financial returns, meaning that the potential for an
investment to contribute to its local economy can play a major role in driving the “impact”
portion of these theses. One investor cited the example of an investment conducted in the Niger
Delta region after the Nigerian Civil War, suggesting that “the region finally became stable, and
companies were beginning to pop up left and right. The people are highly educated and ambition

was strong, but nobody wanted to start a tech company in the middle of a Civil War. Once the
war was over, it finally made sense to set up shop in Nigeria.” In post-conflict regions, there is
also less of a need for risk mitigation tactics like relationships with local lawyers and politicians,
as the regions are significantly more stable than conflict zones. An investor whose firm focuses
primarily on post-conflict regions in Eastern Europe noted that “there are so many less barriers
and bureaucratic hurdles to cross in a post-conflict zone, since the governments know they need
our support to recover from the conflict.”

The aforementioned themes are further explored in Sections 3-5 of this paper, coupled with
existing literature and case studies to better understand the opportunities and barriers associated
with investments into conflict zones.

3. Overview of Investment Opportunities in Conflict Zones

3.1. Analysis of entrepreneurial ecosystems in conflict zones
3.1.1. Overview
It is essential to note that entrepreneurial ecosystems in conflict zones can take myriad
forms. The structure and development process of a conflict-torn nation’s entrepreneurial
landscape is driven by various factors including the extent of conflict in the region, education
rates, quality of life, and political support for private enterprise. Thus, it is impossible to make
sweeping generalizations regarding start-ups in conflict zones. That being said, this paper uses
case studies of Nigeria and Afghanistan to examine 1) the differences between conflict zones
based on factors relating to the conflict and 2) difference based on factors relating to

governmental policy, in order to ultimately understand the scalability and growth potential of
these opportunities.

In countries facing conflict conflict zones, evidence shows that employment rates are
higher in the conflict areas themselves as opposed to the non-conflict regions within the same
country.14 Furthermore, studies have increasingly found that private economic activity and
specifically entrepreneurship is relatively unchanged (and often tends to increase) in the
aftermath of conflicts.15 Reynolds et al. categorized entrepreneurship in emerging economies into
two types: necessity entrepreneurship and opportunity entrepreneurship.16 Necessity
entrepreneurship is described as the development of small businesses in the absence of
employment opportunities. Often found in impoverished regions, necessity entrepreneurship
lacks the potential for scalability due to the lack of support infrastructure.17 Opportunity
entrepreneurship, on the other hand, describes businesses established for the purpose of fulfilling
a specific need with the ultimate aim of expansion and growth.18 Scholars generally agree that
entrepreneurship in emerging markets follows the “necessity” type. In regions facing violent
conflict, self-employment is generally higher, though the activities in which these individuals
engage are lower-quality activities with limited potential for growth. 19 To elucidate the varying
forms of entrepreneurship in conflict zones, this paper uses case studies of Afghanistan

Iyer, S. & Santos, I. (2012). The Employment Challenge in South Asia’s Conflict Zones. World Bank.
Menon, N. and Rodgers, Y. (2013). War and Women’s Work: Evidence from the Conflict in Nepal. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 5 (August)
16 Reynolds, P.D., Camp, S.M., Bygrave, W.D., Autio, E., Hay, M., (2001). GEM Global Entrepreneurship Report,
2001 Summary Report, London Business School and Babson College.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Acs, Z. J., Audretsch, D. B., (2003). Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht.
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(necessity-based) and Nigeria (opportunity-based) to understand the factors promoting
entrepreneurial activity.

3.1.2. Case Study: Afghanistan
Afghanistan has been ravaged extensively by conflict since the early 1980s. Conflict has
generally been scattered across the region. As a consequence, the conflict has imposed
significant economic burdens on the region, serving as a “major impediment to development” 20.
A World Bank study found that companies based out of Afghanistan had little to no external
exports and faced high costs associated with governmental relations, bribes, and access to
financing.21 These economic impediments on large corporations in addition to the lack of
sustainable employment opportunities have incited a growth in local entrepreneurship. A study
by Carli et al. found a significant positive correlation between violent conflict and
entrepreneurship in Afghanistan.

A study by UNU-Wilder found entrepreneurship to serve as a “coping strategy” in
Afghanistan, allowing citizens to fund means of generating income when employment
opportunities are scarce. 22 This can be classified under the “necessity-based” form of
entrepreneurship under Reynolds’ framework. Afghanistan’s necessity-based entrepreneurship
subsequently yields “risk-averse” business development, wherein entrepreneurial ecosystems
consist of service-based enterprises that use limited technology and have no promise of scaling.

Ward C., Mansfield, D., Oldham, P. and Byrd, W. (2008) Afghanistan Economic Incentives and Development
Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production, Kabul: DFID. World Bank.
21 Ibid.
22 Ciarli, T., Di Maio, M., and Langlotz, S. (2014). Difficult Relationships: Conflict, Entrepreneurship and
Economic Development. University of Sussex.
20

Afghanistan has an absence of formal domestic institutions that provide funding or loans to
entrepreneurs, meaning that the growth-focused entrepreneurship generally sought by crossborder venture capitalists is nearly impossible to attain.23 Though entrepreneurship is abundant in
Afghanistan, with nearly 9% of Afghan households relying on small businesses as a source of
income, the form of entrepreneurship is not conducive to external VC funding. 24

3.1.3. Case Study: Nigeria
The area surrounding the Niger Delta has face a tremendous amount of conflict incited by
terrorist group Boko Haram. Since 2013, over 15 million Nigerians have been severely affected
by Boko Haram’s conflict.25 This conflict has incited widespread poverty and unemployment in
Northern Nigeria.26 According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Nigeria ranks 138th
among 192 countries for starting a business. Further, the nation is commonly regarded as a
highly corrupt state wherein external investors and companies have to engage in bribes simply to
conduct business in the region.

Despite the aforementioned conflict, Nigeria is one of Africa’s entrepreneurial hubs. Two
interview respondents with experience across the Middle East and Africa specifically cited
Nigeria as being one of the countries that their firm extensively evaluates when sourcing
investment opportunities. The Nigerian market is filled largely with opportunity-based
entrepreneurs (as per Reynolds’ framework), resulting in more attractive opportunities for VCs.

Ibid.
Ibid.
25 Vittozzi, K. (2016). Abducted by Boko Haram: Femi’s Story. Unicef. https://www.unicef.org/stories/abductedboko-haram-femis-story.
26 Akov, E.T. (2012) “Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Nigeria: A Study of the 2008 Violent
Disturbances in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State”. University of Benin, Nigeria.
23
24

Notably, the Nigerian tech start-up ecosystem has already produced three exits over USD
$100M.27 This has been caused in part by governmental support, with the Nigerian government
having invested in start-up accelerators across the country, aiming to drive job creation. 28
Furthermore, Nigeria has a very young population, with nearly two thirds of the country being
under the age of 25. Most importantly, the conflict in Nigeria takes place in the poor, rural
regions surrounding the Niger Delta, whereas urban areas like Lagos and Abuja are more
distanced from the violent conflict and face less of the economic ramifications.

In stark contrast to Afghanistan, Nigeria’s entrepreneurial ecosystem is more growth-based
and active, receiving substantially greater attention from foreign investors. This can be linked
back to limited geographic scope of the nation’s conflict and the government’s efforts to
incentivize entrepreneurship.

3.2. Investment opportunities in conflict zones
The common major advantage of pursuing investments in conflict-torn economies discussed
by interview respondents focused on capturing value from undervalued firms. They discussed the
fact that limited access to capital in conflict zones encourages entrepreneurs to accept low
valuations to secure funding. Further, entrepreneurs in these regions often value international VC
investment more than domestic investment as it creates greater opportunities to expand into
western markets and mitigate volatility associated with their home countries. Thus, investors are
often able to purchase equity stakes at lower valuations, thereby augmenting the rate of return

OC&C, (2018). Tech Entrepreneurship ecosystem in Nigeria. https://www.occstrategy.com/media/1307/techeship-in-nigeria.pdf
28 Ibid.
27

they can receive from the investment’s success.29 From the calculus of a venture capitalist, they
will only enter a foreign market if it poses some compensating advantage over the VC’s local
market that makes it profitable. 30 In conflict zones, the compressed valuations of investment
opportunities serve as this compensating advantage. One respondent cites their firm’s previous
investment into an Egyptian company which was founded at the height of the Arab Spring. They
noted that the political environment caused the firm’s valuation to plummet, but simultaneously
incited VC investment as a result.
Furthermore, investors often work to draw a distinction between areas in which political
conflict is confined and the entire region in general. One interview respondent noted an
investment pursued in Egypt, wherein the company was based out of a business hub in Cairo that
was separated from the regions of conflict in other parts of the country. Studies show that when
conflict is isolated to a specific area, it is less likely to pose risks towards firms located
elsewhere.31 During the Algerian civil war, for instance, the majority of foreign ventures and
subsidiaries were unaffected as they were based in the southern part of the country and distanced
from the conflict zone in northern Algeria. 32
Prior experience is also a major factor driving a firm’s desire to pursue these opportunities.
Interview respondents with more experience executing investments into conflict zones showed
less resistance to future opportunities, whereas investors with only a few investments in these
regions presented them as “one-off cases” that were unlikely to reoccur. One respondent with
investment experience across 75 countries and various conflict zones noted that their firm’s legal
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department has become increasingly equipped to deal with institutional hurdles and legal
investment barriers. This falls in accordance with a study by Delios and Henisz which found that
MNEs with prior experience in conflict zone may perceive conflict events as political risk and
minor fluctuations, as opposed to a deterrence from investing altogether. 33
Given that VCs hope to make astronomical returns on a small portion of companies in
their portfolio, undervalued opportunities can be instrumental in driving their returns. One
respondent stated that “most of our investments will likely fail anyways, so we would rather
shoot for a few home runs where we can get in for a low valuation”. This respondent manages a
VC firm making dozens of investments on a weekly basis. On the other hand, a respondent from
a VC investment fund making 2-5 investments per month noted that they cannot afford for their
investments to fail regularly, and that their desire to break even on most opportunities
encourages them to avoid most conflict zones.

3.3. Investing under post-conflict conditions
Often, governments of post-conflict states will facilitate these investments through incentive
programs drawing international investment. In transition economies, these forms of investment
help expedite a country’s recovery process and technological development34.
One respondent whose firm focuses primarily on post-conflict zone investments noted
that a transition economy poses significant advantages over a conflict zone as it houses a
functioning government, more robust capital markets, and the potential for VCs to gain a firstmover advantage in the region. Thus, the opportunities in these regions remain undervalued,
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though now there is a greater opportunity for the VC to extract this value through an exit into a
flourishing market. 35 These exit opportunities are vital for VCs are they enable them to recycle
funds into new investments and follow-on investment while encouraging institutional investors
to continue providing capital for these funds. All but one of the respondents noted “likelihood of
a successful exit” as one of the VC’s key priorities when evaluating investments, with every nonimpact focused investor noting it as their top priority. The aforementioned post-conflict investor
noted that his firm’s focus on transition economies has yielded net positive returns on over 50%
of investments, whereas most VC firms expect positive returns on roughly 30% of their
portfolio36. He attributes this trend to a combination of undervalued opportunities and ripe capital
market development in the 5-10 years following the initial investment.

4. Barriers to VC Investing in Conflict Zones

4.1. Institutional barriers
Douglass North defines institutions as “rules of the game in society” or “human-devised
constraints that shape human interaction”.37 In absence of these rules, economies tend to witness
poor legal enforcement and heightened corruption, thereby deterring market participants from
participating in these institutions. 38
Every (12/12) interview participant voluntarily cited “poor legal systems” as a salient barrier
from pursuing VC investments in conflict zones. Effective legal systems are essential in ensuring
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proper investment execution and the subsequent presence of strong internal capital markets. In an
analysis of IPO exits for an American firm’s investments in East Asian portfolio companies,
legality has been highly positively correlated with the probability of such an exit taking place. 39
Furthermore, efficient legal systems have been shown to mitigate information asymmetries
between investors and entrepreneurs. 40 One respondent noted that a lack of a functioning legal
system often prevents the VC from enforcing their rights as part of the investment agreement.
This manifests in the form of being unable to “exercise voting rights, realize profits on the
investment, and negotiate their stake in follow-on investments”. Venture capital investments are
often followed with future rounds of funding that can result in the compression of an initial
investor’s equity stake. Thus, the ability to enforce the right of first refusal and the various voting
class structures is of utmost importance for VCs.
The role of institutional barriers has commonly been expressed in existing literature through
the notion of “transaction costs”. Williamson & Winter categorize transaction costs into three
kinds: search and information cots, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement
costs.41 In the specific context of VC investing, all aforementioned transaction costs are relevant,
with policing and enforcement costs being most salient in conflict zones. 42 Respondents noted
that the turbulent political environments make it difficult to predict whether a start-up will be
legally permitted to even operate in the near future.

Cumming D., Fleming, G., Schwienbacher, A. (2006). Legality and venture capital exits, Journal of Corporate
Finance 12: 214-245.
40 Ibid.
41 Williamson O. & Winter, S. (1993). The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, & Development. Oxford
University Press.
42 Ibid.
39

Transaction costs for foreign venture capital firms are empirically shown to be higher than
those for domestic investors, due to the investors’ limited knowledge of the foreign institutions.43
In conflict zones, these costs are exacerbated by political instability and uncertain legal
conditions. As one respondent with experience in Eastern Europe notes, “in lots of these
revolutionary states, the laws of today are entirely different from the laws of tomorrow”. This
heightens transaction costs by requiring VCs to be especially thorough when bargaining with
entrepreneurs, researching the legal landscape, and regularly checking in with the portfolio
company.

4.2. Rule of Law
The World Justice Project defines the Rule of Law with four universal principles:
Accountability, Just Laws, Open Government, and Accessible Justice. 44 According to the World
Bank, “rule of law is essential to economic development” 45. Studies have shown that judicial
strength and adherence to rule of law are important drivers of foreign direct investment (FDI). 46
Strong, effective courts provide stable assurance to investors that their ownership rights can be
recognized without the need for additional legal intervention. In conflict zones which face
exorbitant amounts of inherent political risks, a strong legal system helps improve overall
stability and create a climate of predictability for investors worried about access to capital and
financial returns.47 Furthermore, the rule of law ensures a meaningful separation between a
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country’s judicial and executive branches, thereby limiting the risk of political corruption and
malfeasance in the time of conflict.
Three interview respondents noted the absence of rule of law and subsequent bureaucratic
hurdles as a deterrence from pursuing conflict zone investments. All three respondents noted that
successful VC investments in emerging markets need to be structured and planned in accordance
with a strong legal system that allows for unique payout and compensation structures to be
implemented. Furthermore, two of these respondents discussed rule of law as a valuable tool in
mitigating corruption and political malfeasance and ensuring effective use of cross-border
investments, with one investor noting, “we can’t, in good conscience, invest in a country where
we have no idea where our money is going. If the courts can’t be trusted to back us and our
entrepreneurs, we can’t trust that our investment is getting to where it needs to be.”
Furthermore, for companies whose business model depends on a proprietary technology,
property laws are essential in ensuring a competitive advantage in their market. Aggregate-level
studies find that property right protections play a major role on the investment strategies of
foreign investors, and that regions with stronger property rights are more likely to receive foreign
investments for technology-driven enterprises.48

4.3. Political risk
One of the inherent risks associated with conflict zones surrounds the threat of political
instability and political violence in the host country. Conflict can impact a VC investment both
directly and indirectly. Directly, civil strife or war may directly hinder the operations of a VCbacked company. One respondent focusing on impact investments in South America noted that
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“even non-violent protests were enough to derail one of our portfolio companies for the year.”
Indirectly, conflict can impact a host country’s operations through government intervention. Li
argues that governments engaged in domestic or international conflict often increase capital
controls and enact tax hikes. 49 This deters future investment flows, limits the potential expansion
of the company, and makes exit opportunities increasingly difficult. 50 Though political risk was
not directly mentioned by any respondent who was directly questioned about investment barriers,
many responses mentioned the inherent issues of conflict and political turbulence as limitations
for start-ups in the host nations, and subsequent deterring factors for venture capitalists.

4.4. Corruption
One third (4/12) of all respondents explicitly cited corruption as being their number one
concern with conflict zone investments. One impact investor noted that “these investments
[often] require you to work with warlords and oligarchs,” and another stated that “the systems
just weren’t built for foreign investment.” There is extensive literature citing the impacts of
corruption on foreign investment. Studies of this type generally find that host-country corruption
has a negative impact on inward FDI due to firms facing predation by the government, limited
security on physical and intellectual property, and the necessity of costly transactions with
unreliable agents.51 Dreher and Gassebner suggest that corruption is often a necessary means to
an end in emerging economies. This includes processes like acquiring a license to operate,
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winning contracts, and overcoming tedious bureaucratic processes.52 This effect has been
consistently observed in investment firms along with MNCs pursuing joint ventures or
subsidiaries in regions facing corruption. 53
Furthermore, aside from the risk posed by the target country itself, firms interfacing with
corrupt governments through investments face potential backlash from western authorities as
well. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions along with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act aim to reduce
corruption by encouraging sanctions against bribery in international business transactions. Their
criteria include FDI carried out by firms based in companies that have adopted the Convention.
One respondent who runs a US-based impact investment fund focused on Eastern Europe notes
that, even though his efforts are ultimately altruistic and beneficial to the countries in which his
firm invests, he avoids all interactions with the country’s governments in light of the FCPA.
Empirical studies support this idea, finding that investors from the US and other countries that
implemented the Convention reduced their investments into corrupt countries.54 Once firms
encounter any enforcement effort by the US government and are sanctioned, they do not
undertake future investments into countries in which they previously invested. 55 For a VC firm
often looking to make follow-on investments and portfolio monitoring actions in these countries,
the risk of a sanction would inevitably diminish their ability to generate value from these
investments, potentially deterring the investment altogether.
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With respect to the technology firms themselves, research shows that corruption harms the
use of technologies available to these firms and the potential efficiency gains they can derive
from existing innovations. As a consequence, start-ups in corrupt states become unable to evolve
and expand at the same rate as start-ups in other countries. This encourages VCs to allocate their
limited capital to domestic opportunities that can better leverage technology and evolve in
uncertain economic environments.

4.5. Analysis of conflict zone investment barriers
Responses to the semi-structured interview accompanied with analyses regarding each
respondent’s background and their respective firm’s investment focus allows for the following
insights and takeaways:
1) Political and economic risks deter virtually all investors from evaluating opportunities in
certain conflict zones where the instability is widespread and poses salient impacts on
entrepreneurial activity.
2) If conflict is isolated in specific regions and/or the investment opportunity is deemed
feasible in spite of political risk, legal hurdles and bureaucratic corruption serve as the
subsequently most impactful barriers.
3) The limited legal institutions present in conflict zones can deter inexperienced investors
from pursuing opportunities in these regions – a factor exacerbated by the need to often
work with corrupt regimes that lack rule of law and standard legal processes.
4) VCs with specialized experience in specific conflict zones (geography-specific impact
investors and small enterprise assistance funds, for instance) can best adapt to these
barriers by tapping into their network and connections in the region.

5. Proposed Adjustments to the Traditional VC Model
Opportunities in conflict zones present high risk and limited probability of upside. That being
said, various efforts can be taken by a VC to mitigate this risk. Thus, VCs would benefit from
adjusting their traditional sourcing, diligence, and execution frameworks when presented with
promising conflict zone opportunities. These risk mitigation tactics are most valuable for older,
more experienced investment firms. As evidenced by interview respondents, older firms have
more established connections and prior experience in certain regions, allowing them to adjust
their investment model with greater flexibility and foresight. As evidenced in Section 3.1,
however, conflict zones can vary tremendously, meaning that these proposed adjustments should
be tailored to the specific situation that a given conflict zone presents.

5.1. Specialized Sourcing
The first adjustment VCs ought to make when initially approaching conflict zone
opportunities takes place at the sourcing level. Namely, VC firms can adjust their sourcing
model to search for companies with high levels of transparency and lower information
asymmetries, thereby mitigating the aforementioned risks associated with these barriers. The
traditional VC sourcing model plays an instrumental role in the firm’s returns, with studies
finding that sourcing has greater importance than VC value-add in determining an investment’s
success.56 The value of sourcing can be attributed to both the quality and quantity of sourcing
efforts. Firms that place a greater emphasis on sourcing, spending more time on these activities
and the expansion of their network, tend to observe greater success in their investments. 57
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Furthermore, the quality of sourcing plays a role in isolating a VC’s investment targets and
criteria. The quality component of the VC sourcing model can benefit most from adjustments to
accommodate conflict zones. Sorensen finds that there is an explicit trade-off between sourcing
quantity and quality58, though this trade-off can prove beneficial for investors in unfamiliar
regions. One interview respondent with a geographically diverse portfolio noted, “when we look
at these unstable regions for the first time, our sourcing standards are going to be much higher
than they would be for North America and Western Europe.” In order to minimize information
asymmetries and prevent legal and political risks from interfering with investments, VCs should
source for investments in conflict zones with limited asymmetry. The mentioned interview
respondent provided examples of potential factors that mitigate these asymmetries, like “the
founder having experience with foreign investors, the company maintaining operations outside
the conflict zone, or the firm even employing an experienced, international legal team.”

5.2. Domain Specialization
Beyond the sourcing stages, investors can better ensure feasibility by harnessing domain
specialization techniques in conflict zones. Specifically, by focusing the firm’s research and
analysis efforts on specific regions and sectors, the investors can better evaluate an opportunity
under the context of its home country. Research has shown that domain specialization through
heightened research can be an instrumental risk management tool for VCs pursuing cross-border
investments59. With respect to the barriers presented in Section 3 of this paper, domain
specialization can be valuable in mitigating both information asymmetries and the consequences
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of governmental corruption. As evidenced through interview findings, investors with prior
experience in conflict zones exhibited less hesitance towards investing in these regions, as the
informational barriers for these opportunities were less salient. An impact investor with
investments focused on South America noted, “we know the Colombian and Venezuelan markets
inside and out – nothing surprises us at this point.” Instead of pursuing a wide array of
opportunities across myriad conflict zones, investors are better off isolating specific regions and
developing an expertise in these areas before investing. This can be accomplished best by highlyestablished VC firms whose existing connections and diligence frameworks can be more easily
adapted to accommodate a new sector specialization model.60

5.3. Value-Add Adjustments
Upon completion of the initial investment, VCs can alter their value-add processes to better
accommodate conflict zone environments. Generally, VCs play a major role in shaping the
management of their portfolio companies61, helping structure the board of directors 62, hire
outside managers, and facilitate the professionalization of start-ups63. These value-add
opportunities are limited and more difficult in conflict zones with unpredictable political and
economic environments. One interview respondent with investment across over 100 geographies
mentioned, “we want to have constant, regular interactions with our companies. If they’re based
in a country that we can’t access for political reasons, that becomes pretty challenging.” Thus,
VCs cannot merely apply the traditional aforementioned value-add recipe used regularly for
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domestic investments. Instead, the investors should focus on strategic monitoring and advice, in
place of operational monitoring. As the respondent mentioned, regular operational monitoring is
unpredictable and can be interrupted due to political instability. Therefore, allocating these same
resources towards strategic value-add can allow VCs to work alongside portfolio companies and
provide value where it is most needed, while avoid information asymmetries and political risks. 64

To further enhance value-add opportunities, VCs can utilize a mechanism of
isomorphism to provide value to their portfolio companies in conflict zones, namely by helping
the firm expand into more stable markets. Isomorphism can serve as a valuable tool in easing the
expansion process for start-ups and subsequently maintaining stability in a VC’s portfolio. 65 This
can either take place through slow expansion and integration into foreign markets, or through
fully relocating the company into the developed markets altogether. 66 This mechanism can
alleviate the risks associated with information asymmetries (as mentioned above) and political
instability. With regards to political instability, the extent to which a firm is impacted by political
risk depends on their direct exposure to economic activities of the region.67 By distancing the
portfolio company’s activities from the conflict zone, the VC firm can ease the risk of
governmental instability interfering with the start-up’s customer and supplier interactions.

To ensure this consistent level of value-add while simultaneously mitigating direct
exposure to the conflict zone, foreign VCs can pursue co-investment opportunities with local
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VCs when conducting the investment. In doing so, cross-border investors can ensure that they
remain exposed to the financial potential that the portfolio company possesses, without needing
to deal with legal and bureaucratic processes with which they are unfamiliar. This involves
outsourcing much of the company’s monitoring and value-add efforts to a domestic firm with
increased familiarity with the ecosystem and political landscape. This mechanism has shown to
be valuable in facilitating successful investments when investors are unfamiliar with the host
country’s ecosystem.68 In the case of Israel, venture programs were created using co-investments
from prominent American, European, and Israeli investors.69 This allowed foreign firms to
access the Israeli markets, while the local investors were tasked with directly managing the
investments. These co-investment programs have allowed Israel’s entrepreneurial ecosystem to
flourish, and for foreign investors to participate in this process.70

6. Conclusion / Takeaways
As venture capital continues to expand as an asset class and start-ups become increasingly
global, cross-border venture capital will become vital in shaping the future of technology. In the
controversial regions known as “conflict zones,” foreign investment can play a major role in
shaping these areas. Conflict zones can be a ripe zone for investment opportunity, allowing
investors to invest in highly promising companies at low valuations, especially in regions like
Nigeria where conflict zones are isolated. Interviews with venture capitalists indicate that myriad
barriers exist that deter investors from pursuing cross-border investments in conflict zones, with
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corruption and institutional/legal barriers being the most salient. These barriers are less impactful
for investors with prior experience in conflict zones, with geographically-focused impact
investors facing less barriers as they pursue these opportunities. For less-experienced investors,
those who pursue myriad investments through high-volume portfolios can best take on this risk.
Ultimately, in order to mitigate this risk, investors ought to take a dynamic approach to VC
investing by adjusting their sourcing and value-add model to accommodate companies in conflict
zones and mitigate the aforementioned political risk.
Further research can be done to empirically evaluate companies based in conflict zones,
and their relative risk compared to companies in developed nations. This can involve quantitative
research evaluating financial risk models, along with qualitative research that aims to understand
how VCs make decisions in politically unstable regions. Through this research, VCs can become
best equipped to source and evaluate start-ups in conflict zones, ultimately making this
inherently “risky business” more effective and predictable.

